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Abstract 
In this paper we carry out a descriptive analysis of lobbying expenditures on migration in 
the US between 1998 and 2005. While PAC contributions and lobbying are in general 
positively correlated, our results suggest that this is not the case when it comes to 
lobbying on migration. As a result, any analysis of the role of lobbying in migration 
should not focus on PAC contributions alone. Comparing lobbying on migration and 
trade, we find that substantially more resources are spent on the latter than on the former. 
Finally, lobbying on migration appears to be more concentrated than lobbying on trade 
both across sectors and across organizations.  
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1. Introduction 
Only a small minority of voters in the main destinations of immigrant flows 
favours more open migration policies. Based on the National Identity Module of the 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), in 1995, less than 10 percent of the 
respondents was in favour of increasing the number of immigrants to their country.5 The 
fraction of voters in favour of further immigration was also very low in 2003 (Mayda 
2006). According to the ISSP survey carried out in that year,6 only 11 percent of 
respondents was in favour of increasing the number of foreigners allowed into the 
country (Facchini and Mayda 2008).7 More recently, a survey carried out by the German 
Marshall Fund revealed that, in 2011, in five European countries8 only 4 percent of the 
population felt that there were too few immigrants – i.e., only 4 percent of the population 
was presumably in favour of a more open policy stance – while 47 percent felt that there 
were too many of them.9 
Given the extent of opposition to immigration revealed by public opinion surveys, 
one might wonder why governments allow migration to take place at all. In fact a simple 
median-voter model,10 applied to the voters’ preferences we observe in the data, would 
predict close-to-zero flows, while actual arrivals are non trivial in number. How can this 
“public opinion puzzle” – as has been labeled in the political science literature (Freeman 
1992, Joppke 1998) – be explained? Why are policy-makers willing to let the size of 
migration be much larger than desired by the majority of their voters? One very likely 
explanation of the discrepancy between voters’ opinions and the actual size of migration 
flows is that the political process through which heterogeneous voters’ preferences are 
aggregated is richer than a simple referendum (where each voter has the same weight). In 
particular domestic interest groups, many of which are pro-migration, are likely to play 
an important role.11 In fact, there is abundant anecdotal evidence supporting this view 
                                                
5 The 1995 ISSP survey covered more than 20 high- and middle-income countries. 
6 The 2003 ISSP survey covered 33 high- and middle-income countries. 
7 In particular, in the United States, the fraction of voters in favor of increasing the number of immigrants 
to the US was 8% in 1995 and 10% in 2003. 
8 France, Germany, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom. 
9 The corresponding percentages in the United States were in the same year 4% and 44%. 
10 In the median voter model, policies are chosen according to the preferences of the majority (for example, 
in a referendum). 
11 Note that, in standard labor-economics models, immigration produces net gains in the destination country 
as gains to the capital owners from cheap labor outweigh losses to the workers (see, for example, Borjas 
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dating back to the great migration of the nineteenth century as well as to more recent 
developments. In the past, active subsidization of immigration has been demanded and 
obtained by business associations in many labor-scarce countries, as documented by 
Timmer and Williamson (1996). In her study of the political economy of the introduction 
of the 1917 Literacy Test provision in the U.S., Goldin (1994) points out that capital 
owners were against this restrictive measure and actively lobbied against it.  
More recently, business lobbies have been in favor of migration both in the U.S. 
and in Europe. For instance, during the “dot com” boom at the end of the nineties, high 
tech firms have intensively and successfully lobbied the U.S. Congress to increase the 
number of H-1B visas.12 At the same time, U.S. hospitals and healthcare providers have 
been able to secure an increase in the number of H-1C visas awarded to foreign nurses. 
Finally, after the 2006 U.S. midterm elections, the vice-president of Technet, a lobbying 
group for technology companies, stressed that the main goal of the reforms proposed by 
her group was the relaxation of migration policy constraints.13 New visa categories have 
also been introduced in the U.S. as the result of lobbying activities. An interesting 
example is the case of H-2R visas. In 2005, the quota for H-2B visas was filled with none 
of them going to the seafood industry in Maryland.14 This industry started heavy lobbying 
of the Maryland senator Barbara A. Mikulski, who was able to add a last-minute 
amendment to the Tsunami Relief Act (P.L. 109-13) of May 11, 2005 (Cox News May 4, 
2006). As a result, a new visa category was introduced, H-2R visas. The requirements for 
H-2R visas are the same as for H-2B visas, but there is no quota. As long as the 
individual has held an H-2B visa in one of the previous three fiscal years, he can get an 
                                                                                                                                            
1995). Therefore, another explanation of the public opinion puzzle is that, besides political considerations, 
policymakers also care about social welfare.  
12 The H-1B is a non-immigrant visa that enables U.S. employers to temporarily hire foreign workers in 
specialty occupations, which typically require the attainment of a bachelor’s degree as a minimum. The 
work permit lasts for three years, is tied to the initial sponsor, and the current cap is set at 85,000 per year. 
Writing at the peak of the boom Goldsborough (2000) pointed out: “Immigration policy today is driven by 
businesses that need more workers, skilled and unskilled, legal and illegal [...] During the annual debate on 
H-1B visas two years ago, Silicon Valley executives trooped before Congress, warning of a Y2K computer 
disaster unless the number of H-1B visas was increased.” 
13 CIO, December 19 2006, available at http://www.cio.com/article/27581/ 
14 H-2B visas are for temporary workers in unskilled, seasonal, non-agricultural occupations (for example, 
in the planting-pine-trees industry; the resort industry, the seafood industry, the gardening industry in the 
North of the United States, etc.). 
 4 
H-2R visa. This has substantially expanded the number of temporary, non-agricultural 
workers allowed to enter the U.S.. 
In Europe, pro-migration business interest groups appear to play a similar role. 
For example, in the UK, associations like the Business for New Europe group (BNE)15 
have issued statements suggesting that “...the UK should continue with its open door 
policy”, on the eve of the discussion on introducing a cap on migration from Bulgaria and 
Romania, once the two countries became members of the European Union (Agence 
France Press, August 30 2006).  
Note that not all interest groups are in favor of migration. Labor unions, for 
example, have historically been an important political force against free migration. 
However, the evidence in the literature is that anti-migration pressures by interest groups 
have become less effective over time.16 
While anecdotal evidence on the role played by interest groups is abundant, 
systematic empirical analyses are scarce. The only studies in the literature, which 
empirically investigate the political economy of migration policy, with a specific focus 
on lobbying activity, are Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001), Facchini and Mayda (2008), 
Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2011) and Kerr, Lincoln and Mishra (2013) (details of each 
paper are described in Section 2.). In particular, Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2011) 
analyze the impact of lobbying activity on migration policy in the U.S. using a newly 
available dataset on lobbying expenditures on immigration. While the dataset provides 
information at the firm level, Facchini, Mayda and Mishra only focus on variation across 
sectors (since data on the number of visas – which they use as the dependent variable – 
and on other relevant economic variables are only available at that level). 
In this paper, we use the same dataset as Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2011) and 
carry out a descriptive analysis of lobbying expenditures on migration, in the United 
States, both across sectors and across lobbying organizations, between 1998 and 2005.17 
                                                
15 This is a UK based pressure group. The heads of the supermarket chain Sainsburys and the head of the 
European division of the investment bank Merrill Lynch were among the signatories. 
16 See, for example, Facchini and Mayda (2008). This paper’s results are consistent with the fact that, in 
recent years, U.S. labor unions have substantially toned down the rhetoric against migration. 
17 The political environment has changed significantly since 2005. For example, the groups applying for H-
1B visas have changed significantly since the early 2000s, with a shift towards Indian firms.  Consider for 
example the Citizens United decision in 2010 which allowed corporations and unions to spend unlimited 
sums on ads and other political tools to convince people to vote for/against a candidate. 
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The dataset, developed by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), contains information 
on the policy area targeted by lobbying activities. As a result, we can quantify the 
lobbying expenditures that are channeled towards shaping immigration policy. This 
represents a significant improvement in the quality of the data relative to the previous 
literature which has used, instead, political action committees (PAC) campaign 
contributions.18 First, PAC contributions represent only a small fraction (10%) of targeted 
political activity, the remainder being made up by lobbying expenditures. Second, PAC 
contributions cannot be disaggregated by issue and, thus, cannot be easily linked to a 
particular policy. Finally, we compare our findings on lobbying on migration to results on 
lobbying on trade.   
Several interesting points emerge from our analysis. First, while PAC 
contributions and lobbying are in general positively correlated, our results suggest that 
this is not the case when it comes to lobbying on migration. As a result any analysis that 
focuses on the role of pressure group activity in affecting migration should take 
advantage of these new data on lobbying, rather than relying only on PAC contribution 
data. Second, while overall lobbying expenditures increased steadily over our sample 
period, lobbying on both migration and trade appears to fluctuate more. Third, the total 
amount spent on lobbying for immigration and trade never exceeded 6 percent of the total 
lobbying contributions, and the total amount contributed with the purpose of shaping 
trade policy was typically four to six times larger than the amount contributed to shape 
migration policy (see Table 1). Fourth, turning to the sectoral distribution of lobbying 
activities, we argue that lobbying on migration is substantially more concentrated in a 
few sectors than lobbying on trade. Finally, we observe that a similar pattern emerges 
when we examine the contributions of individual organizations. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews papers in the 
literature which focus on the political economy of migration policy in general and, in 
particular, on the role played by interest groups. Section 3 describes the dataset on 
lobbying expenditures on migration. Section 4 carries out the descriptive analysis of the 
dataset on lobbying expenditures. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                
18 See for example Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). 
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2. Related Literature 
The literature on the political economy of migration policy is very thin and 
mainly theoretical. Benhabib (1996), Ortega (2005) and Facchini and Testa (2009) 
develop models in which migration policy is the outcome of majority voting, while 
Facchini and Willman (2005) and Epstein and Nizan (2006) theoretically focus on the 
role played by pressure groups. 
In a seminal contribution, Benhabib (1996) considers the human capital 
requirements that would be imposed on potential immigrants by an income-maximizing 
polity under majority voting. Output is modeled using a constant returns to scale 
production function combining labor with human and/or physical capital. The median 
voter chooses to admit individuals who supply a set of factors that are complementary to 
her own endowment. As a result, if the median voter is unskilled, he will choose a policy 
that sets a lower bound on the human-capital labor ratio of the immigrants, that is only 
skilled foreigners will be admitted. On the other hand, if the median voter is highly 
educated, he will set an upper bound on the skill level of the immigrants, and thus will be 
in favor of admitting only individuals with low levels of education. Since in practice it is 
difficult to enforce this upper bound, the policy chosen by a skilled median voter is likely 
to be free migration. The main shortcoming of this analysis is that the constant returns to 
scale assumption might lead to counterintuitive results. In fact, while the optimal policy 
prescribes bounds on the skill profiles of the individuals to be admitted, it does not say 
anything about the actual size of the inflows. This is clearly at odds with the policies 
followed by countries around the world. 
A different solution to this problem has been proposed by Ortega (2005), who 
extends Benhabib’s model to a dynamic setting to explore the trade off between the short 
run economic impact of immigration and its medium to long run political effect.19 In 
particular, while immigration has an effect only on the labor market in the current period, 
in the future it also shapes the political balance of the destination country, as the 
descendants of migrants gain the right to vote. As a result, on the one hand, skilled 
natives prefer an immigration policy that admits unskilled foreign workers since, due to 
complementarities in production, this policy increases skilled wages. On the other, the 
                                                
19 See also Ortega (2010). 
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arrival of unskilled immigrants and the persistence of skill levels across generations can 
give rise to a situation in which unskilled workers gain the political majority and, 
therefore, vote for policies that benefit them as a group. Thus, through the political 
channel, skilled natives (and a skilled median voter) prefer an immigration policy that 
admits skilled foreign workers. The interplay between these two forces allows Ortega to 
characterize the equilibrium migration quotas, i.e. to derive a prediction in terms of the 
size of migration inflows. 
The paper that is most closely related to our analysis is Facchini and Willmann 
(2005). Using the menu auction framework pioneered by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), 
the authors model the determination of policies towards international factor mobility as 
the result of the interaction between organized groups and an elected politician. Using a 
one-good multiple factors framework, the model highlights how policies depend on both 
whether a production factor is represented or not by a lobby and on the degree of 
substitutability/complementarity between factors. 
A small theoretical literature has also emerged explicitly modeling the role played 
by organized groups in shaping migration policy in a setting with imperfectly competitive 
factor markets. Amegashie (2004) models migration policy as the result of an all pay 
auction in which the auctioneer is represented by the government and the participants are 
a firm and a union. Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (2008) consider instead a model in which 
entrepreneurs and a union interact with an elected politician to determine the number of 
foreign workers to be admitted. Their main result is that, if the government chooses the 
level of immigration to maximize a weighted average of the welfare of workers and 
entrepreneurs, the presence of a union ends up hurting the very same workers which the 
union is meant to represent and protect. This result is based on a second best argument: 
the government attempts to reduce the labor market distortion introduced by the union by 
allowing a number of immigrants in the country that is larger than the one it would have 
admitted in the presence of a competitive labor market. This leads to a reduction in the 
union wage that can no longer compensate workers for the unemployment risk generated 
by the presence of the union. 
From an empirical point of view, very few papers focus on political-economy 
determinants of migration policy. Facchini and Steinhardt (2011) investigate the 
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determinants of the voting behaviour of House members on immigration policy measures 
introduced in the United States between 1973 and 2006. This paper uncovers the 
important role played by the labor market characteristics of the district electing the 
representative. Other studies investigate the role of lobbying, using data at the industry or 
occupational level. Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2011) offer the first systematic 
empirical analysis of the role of interest groups in shaping contemporary U.S. migration 
policy. Using a newly available dataset for the years between 2001 and 2005, in which 
lobbying expenditures can be directly linked to immigration policies, the paper finds that 
sectors where pro-immigration business groups are more active (i.e. contribute more) 
tend to be allocated a larger number of work and related visas. On the other hand, in 
sectors in which anti-immigration labour unions are more powerful, lower numbers of 
immigrants are admitted. The estimates of the paper suggest that a 10% increase in the 
size of migration lobbying expenditures (per native worker) by business groups is 
associated with a 3.1% larger number of visas (per native worker), while a one-
percentage-point increase in union density – for example, moving from 10 to 11 
percentage points, which amounts to a 10% increase in the union membership rate – 
reduces it by 3.1%. The results are robust to endogeneity concerns, which are addressed 
by introducing a number of industry-level control variables (e.g. output, prices, origin 
country effects, etc.), by performing a falsification exercise and, finally, by using an 
instrumental-variable estimation strategy. 
Facchini and Mayda (2008) focus, instead, on cleavages across occupation/skill 
lines, rather than across sectors. Using a panel covering the period 1994-2005 and 
differentiating labour according to both skill levels and occupations, the paper finds 
systematic evidence suggesting that the lobbying activity of organized labour leads to a 
reduction in the inflow of foreign workers in the same occupation/education cell – this 
effect is driven by substitutability – and to an increase in the inflow of foreign workers in 
different occupation/education cells – this effect is driven by complementarity. This 
suggests that, for example, politically-organized doctors will lobby the government and 
succeed in decreasing the number of foreign doctors to the U.S. and in increasing the 
number of foreign nurses. Another paper that provides indirect empirical evidence on the 
role played by lobbying in shaping U.S. migration policy is Hanson and Spilimbergo 
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(2001). Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001) focus on U.S. border enforcement and show that 
it softens when sectors using illegal immigrants expand. The authors suggest that “sectors 
that benefit greatly from lower border enforcement, such as apparel and agriculture, 
lobby heavily on the issue, while remaining sectors that benefit modestly or not at all are 
politically inactive.” (page 636). 
 Finally, unlike other empirical studies which focus on the effect of lobbying on 
outcomes, Kerr, Lincoln, and Mishra (2013) analyze the determinants of lobbying and are 
among the first to provide systematic evidence on the dynamics of lobbying activities. 
The paper finds evidence of persistence, i.e. whether or not a firm lobbied in the past has 
a significant effect on whether it lobbies in the current period. A priori, there are reasons 
to believe that lobbying should exhibit significant entry and exit over time.20 However, 
this is not what the authors find. The authors argue that this persistence is due to barriers 
to entry into lobbying that firms face. They assess this argument using a number of 
different estimation approaches. They also study how firms respond to a predetermined 
policy change, i.e. the expiration of the increase in the H-1B visa cap that occurred in 
2004. The data shows that firms dependent on skilled immigration and active in lobbying 
adjust their lobbying behaviour towards immigration-specific issues in response to the 
decline. On the other hand, firms that were not previously lobbying do not start lobbying 
in response to the policy shift. 
To conclude, very few works have focused on the political economy of migration 
policy, especially from an empirical point of view. This is even more surprising if we 
compare migration to another facet of international economic integration, namely 
international trade. A vast theoretical and empirical literature considers the political-
economy determinants of trade policy, trying to understand the forces that work against 
and in favor of free trade.21 This is despite the fact that, as trade restrictions have been 
                                                
20 For example, the maxim that “a week is a lifetime in politics” suggests that firms might only lobby when 
legislation directly affecting them is actively being considered. 
21 See Rodrik (1995), Helpman (1997) and Gawande and Krishna (2003) for excellent surveys of the trade 
literature. 
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drastically reduced, the benefits from elimination of existing trade barriers are much 
smaller than the gains that could be achieved by freeing international migration.22  
 
3. Data on lobbying expenditures 
In the United States, special interest groups can legally influence the policy 
formation process by offering campaign contributions to political candidates for election 
purposes or by hiring organizations which lobby incumbent members of Congress and of 
federal agencies on their behalf. Starting already in 1911, after a vigorous campaign 
initiated by President Theodore Roosevelt to limit the influence of business in politics, 
legislation was passed to require disclosure of contributions directed to political 
candidates for campaign purposes (Ansolabehere, de Figueredo, and Snyder 2003). The 
data on campaign contributions have been widely used in the political science and 
international economics literatures and are collected by the Federal Election Commission. 
The activities of lobbying organizations have instead remained much more 
obscure. Only in 1995, with the introduction of the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA), 
lobbying organizations and their clients have been required to provide a substantial 
amount of information on their government relations activities. In particular, starting 
from 1996 all lobbyists must file semi-annual (and more recently quarterly) reports with 
the Secretary of the Senate's Office of Public Records (SOPR), listing the name of each 
client (either a firm, a labor union or other organization23) and the total income they have 
received from each of them. At the same time, all lobbying organizations with in-house 
lobbying departments are asked to file similar reports to the SOPR. Importantly, 
legislation requires the disclosure not only of the dollar amounts actually received/spent, 
but also of the (general) policy issues for which lobbying has taken place. Table A1 in the 
Appendix shows a list of 76 (general) issues at least one of which has to be entered by the 
filer. The filer can list more than one issue. In that case, it has to use a separate page of 
the form for each code selected. The list of issues includes immigration (IMM), trade 
                                                
22 A World Bank study estimates that the benefits to poor countries of rich countries allowing only a 3 
percent rise in their labor force by relaxing migration restrictions is US$300 billion per year (Pritchett 
2006). 
23 When we refer to either firms, labor unions or other organizations which hire lobbyists (either in house or 
externally), we will call them “lobbying organizations.” On the other hand, we will call external lobbyists 
(for example those whose offices are located on K Street in Washington DC) “lobbying firms.” 
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(TRD), etc.24 For each general issue, the filer also may (but does not necessarily have to) 
list the specific issue(s) for which it lobbied during the semi-annual period (for example, 
specific issues could be particular bills before Congress or specific executive branch 
actions).25 
Lobbying firms are required to provide a good-faith estimate, which can be 
rounded to the nearest $20,000, of all lobbying-related income in each six-month period. 
Likewise, lobbying organizations with in-house lobbying departments are required to 
provide a good-faith estimate, which can be rounded to the nearest $20,000, of all 
lobbying-related expenditures in a six-month period. A lobbying firm or lobbying 
organization that, respectively receives or spends less than $10,000 in any six-month 
period, does not have to state its income or expenditures. If lobbying is not disclosed in 
such cases, the figure is reported by CRP as zero. However, as Kerr, Lincoln, and Mishra 
(2013) argue, the measurement error induced by reporting requirements is likely to be 
minimal. 
The data on lobbying incomes/expenditures are compiled by CRP in Washington 
D.C. using the semi-annual lobbying disclosure reports filed with SOPR and posted to its 
website (www.crp.org). The reports used in this paper cover lobbying activity that took 
place from 1998 through 2005. Annual lobbying incomes and expenditures are calculated 
by adding mid-year totals and year-end totals. Whenever a lobbying report is amended, 
income/expense figures from the amendment are generally used instead of those from the 
original filing. Often, however, CRP staff determines that the income/expense figures on 
the amendment are not accurate. In those instances, figures from the original filing are 
used. 
Occasionally, income that an outside lobbying firm reports receiving from a 
lobbying organization is greater than the organization's reported lobbying expenditures. 
                                                
24 Surprisingly, the list of issues also includes names of some industries, e.g. apparel, computer, tobacco 
etc. 
25 According to the Lobbying Disclosure Act, the term “lobbying activities” refers to “lobbying contacts 
and efforts in support of such contacts, including preparation and planning activities, research and other 
background work that is intended, at the time it is performed, for use in contacts, and coordination with the 
lobbying activities of others.” Lobbying could take place by setting up an in-house lobbying department or 
by hiring external consultants. While setting up a whole office for in-house operations is likely more 
expensive, if a firm employs a lobbyist externally the new hire still has to spend a significant amount of 
time learning the particular needs and characteristics of their new client and how items currently on the 
agenda will affect them specifically. 
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Many such discrepancies can be explained by the fact that the lobbying organization and 
the outside lobbying firm use different filing methods (see Appendix at the end of the 
paper for a detailed description of different filing methods). When both organizations use 
the same method, discrepancies are generally due to filer error. In cases not already 
resolved in previous reports and where the discrepancy exceeds the $20,000 that can be 
attributed to rounding, the lobbying organization's expenditures rather than the lobbying 
firm's reported income are used. The only exception is when an organization reports no 
lobbying expenditures, while the outside lobbying firm lists an actual payment. In such 
cases, the figure reported by the lobbying firm is used. 
In cases where the data appear to contain errors, official Senate records are 
consulted and, when necessary, the CRP contacts SOPR or the lobbying organizations for 
clarification. The CRP standardizes variations in names of individuals and organizations 
to clearly identify them and more accurately represent their total lobbying expenditures.26 
Table A2 in the Appendix shows a sample form filled by Microsoft for lobbying 
activity between January-June 2005. Only three selected pages of the form are shown in 
the appendix. Page 1 shows the name and details of Microsoft, the time period covered 
by the report (January 1 – June 30, 2005) and the expenses incurred by Microsoft for 
lobbying activity during this period (US$4.5 million).27 The lobbying expenditure is 
listed once on the first page of the form and the amount is not split between the issues. 
Microsoft lists “Method C” as the reporting method, i.e. reported amounts use the 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) definition of lobbying activities. This method is available 
to any registrant that is subject to Section 162(e) of the IRC (see Appendix at the end of 
the paper for a discussion of this point).28 
The other two pages of the form in Table A2 show two general issues for which 
Microsoft engaged in lobbying activity during the six-month period – immigration 
                                                
26 Please note that, in our dataset, lobbying organizations only appear once in each year. In addition, in 
cases where both a parent and its subsidiary organizations lobby or hire lobbyists, the Center attributes 
lobbying spending to the parent organization. Therefore, the lobbying totals reported by the Center for a 
parent organization may not reflect its original filing with the Senate, but rather the combined expenditures 
of all related entities. Moreover, when companies merge within any two-year election cycle, their lobbying 
expenditures are combined and attributed to the new entity. 
27 Note that each report contains only an indication of the total spent by the organization, and not of the 
amount spent for a specific issue. For details on how we compute our estimates of the amounts contributed 
for each purpose, see Section 4.  
28 The grass-roots and state lobbying expenses are not subtracted from this amount. 
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(IMM) and trade (TRD). Microsoft lists seven other issues in its report – e.g., taxation 
(TAX) – which are not shown in the appendix table. For immigration, the specific issues 
listed by Microsoft are H-1B visas, L-1 visas and Program Electronic Review 
Management (PERM) regulations. For trade, some of the specific issues listed include the 
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States FTA Implementation Act, software 
piracy and procurement issues in China, interpretation and enforcement of the WTO 
agreement on intellectual property (TRIPS), etc. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the availability of lobbying expenditure data 
allows for a significant improvement in the measurement of the intensity of pressure 
groups’ activities compared to the previous literature which has used, instead, political 
action committees (PAC) campaign contributions. As shown in Table 1, between 1999 
and 200429, interest groups have spent on average about 3.8 billion U.S. dollars per 
political cycle on targeted political activity, which includes PAC campaign contributions 
and lobbying expenditures.30 Lobbying expenditures represent by far the bulk of all 
interest groups money (close to ninety percent).31 Therefore, there are two advantages in 
using lobbying expenditures rather than PAC contributions to capture the intensity of the 
activity of pressure groups. First, PAC contributions represent only a small fraction of 
interest groups’ targeted political activity (10 percent). Second, linking campaign 
contributions to particular policy issues is very difficult and often requires some ad-hoc 
assumptions.32 Overall, our data suggest that immigration and trade are two significant 
issues over which pressure groups carry out their activities, representing together between 
                                                
29 Table 1 and Figure 1 are based on data for the full political cycles included in our sample period, i.e. the 
1999-2000, the 2001-2002 and the 2003-2004 political cycles. 
30We follow the literature that excludes, from targeted-political-activity figures, “soft money” 
contributions, which went to parties for general party-building activities not directly related to Federal 
campaigns; in addition, soft money contributions cannot be associated with any particular interest or issue 
(see Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose 2000 and Tripathi, Ansolabehere, and Snyder 2002). Soft money 
contributions have been banned by the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. 
31 In a recent survey of the literature de Figueredo and Richter (2014) argue that, in the 2011-2012 political 
cycle, PAC contributions amounted to approximately 750 million dollars per year, whereas the total 
lobbying expenditures by organized groups reached 3.5 billion dollars. In other words, while the latter 
continue to represent the vast majority of interest groups money, the most recent figures suggest that PAC 
contributions have become relatively more important, representing approximately eighteen percent of the 
total.  
32 For instance, in their pioneering work on the estimation of Grossman and Helpman (1994) protection for 
sale model, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) have used threshold levels for PAC expenditures to identify 
whether a sector is politically organized or not, from the point of view of trade policy determination. 
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4.5 and 5.9 percent of the total lobbying expenditures in the political cycles covered in 
our analysis (see Table 1). 
The importance of complementing the PAC data with the lobbying data can be 
seen by examining the three scatter plots illustrated in Figure 1 – which is based on 
averages over the three election cycles that occurred between 1999 and 2004. The first 
links overall lobbying expenditures (i.e. on all issues) and PAC contributions; the second 
depicts the relationship between lobbying expenditures associated with immigration 
policy33 and PAC contributions, whereas the third illustrates the link between lobbying 
expenditures on trade policy and PAC contributions. A few interesting patterns emerge. 
The first panel shows a positive and significant correlation between overall (i.e., on any 
issue) lobbying expenditures and PAC contributions across sectors. This result is 
consistent with findings in the political science literature suggesting that PAC 
contributions are integral to groups’ lobbying efforts, i.e. they allow them to gain access 
to policymakers (Tripathi, Ansolabehere, and Snyder 2002). A similar pattern can be also 
identified while looking at the relationship between lobbying on trade policy and PAC  
contributions (see also Ludema, Mayda and Mishra 2011). In contrast, the very low 
correlation between PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures for migration policy, 
emerging from the central panel, is striking. It suggests that, if we were to use only the 
data on PAC contributions as a proxy for interest groups’ activity on migration policy, we 
would obtain misleading results. Further details about the construction of the dataset on 
lobbying expenditures are discussed in the Appendix. 
 
4. Descriptive analysis of the data on lobbying expenditures 
In this paper, we use data at the lobbying-organization-level on lobbying 
expenditures of lobbying organizations (i.e., firms, labor unions or other organizations) 
from the CRP dataset. In the case of a lobbying organization which “self-files” (i.e., an 
organization with an in-house lobbying department), the CRP uses the figure in its report, 
which includes both in-house and external lobbying expenditures for the period. In the 
case of an organization which does not “self-file,” the CRP uses the sum of its contracts 
with outside lobbying firms to represent its lobbying expenditures for the period. 
                                                
33 In the terminology of the following section, these correspond to “total lobbying expenditures.” 
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Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the evolution of lobbying expenditures over time. Figure 
2 shows “overall lobbying expenditures,” while Figure 3 and 4 show respectively  “total 
lobbying expenditures” and “lobbying expenditures ” on migration and – as a benchmark 
– on international trade.34 The “overall lobbying expenditures” are given by the sum of 
lobbying-organization-level lobbying expenditures on any issue of all organizations 
active in lobbying in all industries, year by year. Thus, this is an indicator of how 
aggressively organizations carry out lobbying activity in general in the economy. The 
“total lobbying expenditures” (on immigration or trade) are equal to the sum of lobbying 
expenditures on any issue by organizations spending money on respectively migration or 
trade, in all industries, year by year. The “lobbying expenditures” (on immigration or 
trade) are instead equal to lobbying expenditures only on respectively migration or trade 
by organizations spending money on these issues, in all industries, year by year. 
“Lobbying expenditures” (on immigration or trade) are computed using a two-step 
procedure. First, only those organizations are considered which list respectively 
migration or trade in their lobbying report. Second, the total expenditure of these 
organizations is split equally among all the issues they lobbied for.35 “Lobbying 
expenditures” represent the most direct measure of lobbying activity related to the 
specific issue. On the other hand, “total lobbying expenditures” represent an upper bound 
of lobbying expenditures on the specific issue, since they also include all lobbying 
expenditures on other issues. The motivation for interpreting “total lobbying 
expenditures” as an upper bound of lobbying expenditures on respectively migration or 
trade is that lobbying expenditures are to a certain extent fungible across issues. 
Overall lobbying expenditures have grown by more than 50% from US$1.4 bn in 
1998 to US$2.3 bn in 2005. According to Figure 2, the increase has been steady over the 
years. Total lobbying expenditures on immigration have grown by approximately 15% 
from US$196 mn in 1998 to US$227 mn in 2005, whereas total lobbying expenditures on 
trade have increased by 32% from US$564 mn in 1998 to US$745 mn in 2005. Figure 3 
shows an irregular pattern over the 1998-2005 period, but spending on immigration and 
                                                
34 Figures 3 and 4 use data from the fourth column (sum) of Tables 2 and 4, respectively. 
35 Recall that the lobbying expenditure of a firm is listed only once in the lobbying report, on the first page, 
and the reported amount is not split between the issues the firm lobbies for. Thus, to be as neutral as 
possible, in the empirical analysis we split the total amount on the first page equally among issues. 
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trade appear to be positively correlated. Finally, according to Figure 4, lobbying 
expenditures on migration have grown by more than 25 percent from US$18 mn in 1998 
to US$23 mn in 2005, whereas lobbying expenditures on trade have increased by more 
than 50 percent over the same time period, i.e. from US$60 mn in 1998 to US$92 mn in 
2005. Figure 4 shows again an irregular pattern over time and the correlation between 
expenditures on immigration and trade is lower when we use this measure.  
It is not clear how to interpret the fact that interest groups’ activity on migration 
was lower in 2003, compared to 2000 (see Figures 3 and 4). One possibility is that this 
decrease is due to the September 11 attacks, which likely affected migration political-
economy dynamics. In other words, it might be that lobbying expenditures on migration 
reacted to (decreased due to) the new political climate in the U.S.. Alternatively the 
decrease in lobbying activity over 2000-2003, followed by the increase in 2004-2005, 
could be related to the changes in the H-1B visa quotas over those years. The national cap 
in H-1B visas was 115,000 in 2000, 195,000 in 2001-2003, 65,000 in 2004 and 85,000 in 
2005. Thus we can identify a major break in migration policy in 2004, with policy being 
much more open in 2000-2003 and much more closed in 2004-2005. Thus these few 
years of data suggest that lobbying expenditures on migration were low in the years in 
which the H-1B cap was high and vice versa. However, it is also possible to interpret the 
data as suggesting that the H-1B cap was high when previous years’ lobbying 
expenditures on migration were high and vice versa. Both the robustness of these patterns 
and the direction of causality are beyond the scope of this paper and should be analyzed 
in future research (see, for example, Kerr, Lincoln and Mishra 2013). 
Tables 2, 3, and 4 provide more detailed information on lobbying activity on 
immigration and trade, year by year. These tables focus on the restricted sample of  
organizations which indicated immigration (or trade) as an issue in their lobbying report 
in the years included between 1998 and 2005. Over the entire period, organizations 
lobbied for migration purposes 1662 times (some of these observations correspond to the 
same lobbying organization in different years), whereas they did so 6143 times for trade 
issues, i.e. approximately four times more often. For example, in 1998 there were 220 
(642) organizations which hired lobbyists (in house or external) for migration (trade) 
purposes. These numbers went up and down over the years but do show an overall 
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positive trend. According to Table 2, over this period, on average a firm in this sample 
spent approximately US$790,000 on lobbying on migration in a given year, and slightly 
more than that on trade, i.e. US$810,000. Note that these numbers – as clarified above – 
include lobbying on any issue by these organizations  (“total lobbying expenditures”), i.e. 
they are an upper bound of how much an organization in this sample spent to influence 
these two policy areas. Table 3 gives instead information, more specifically, on “lobbying 
expenditures” on migration and trade of the same group of organizations. Over this 
period, on average an organization in this sample spent approximately US$78,000 on 
migration in a given year and US$97,000 on trade policy in a given year. We will focus 
our comments on Table 3 since it provides the most direct evidence on migration and 
trade lobbying. Between 1998 and 2005, a total of US$130mn were spent on lobbying 
specifically targeted at shaping US migration policy and US$598mn to shape trade 
policy.  
Table 4 focuses on an even more restricted sample, i.e. lobbying organizations 
spending only on immigration or trade. In other words, these are the organizations which 
indicate only, respectively, migration or trade in their lobbying report. Over the 1998-
2005 period, organizations lobbied only on migration 98 times, and only on trade 621 
times. For example, in 1998 there were 12 organizations who hired lobbyists exclusively 
for migration purposes, whereas 63 did so for trade. This number went up to 18 in 2005 
for migration and to 97 for trade. On average, between 1998 and 2005, organizations 
spending only on immigration disbursed approximately US$120,000 in a given year, 
whereas the corresponding figure for lobbying only on trade was slightly higher at 
US$132,000. If we compare these numbers to the corresponding numbers in Table 3, we 
can see that lobbying expenditures on migration of organizations exclusively interested in 
migration are higher than for organizations doing lobbying on migration and other issues 
(and the same holds true for trade). The numbers in Table 4 are important because they 
give us the exact expenditure on respectively migration and trade of organizations which 
exclusively lobby on these issues, therefore these values are not affected by even splitting 
(see footnote 26). 
The Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) matches each lobbying organization in 
its dataset to an industry. (Note that it is CRP that assigns aggregator groups to different 
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sectors in the analysis. For example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is assigned to the 
industry “business associations,” which is the case for other aggregator groups, like the 
National Federation of Independent Business and the Alliance for Health Care 
Competitiveness.) Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 show summary statistics by sector – using the 
CRP industry classification – on average over the 1998-2005 period. These tables again 
focus on the restricted sample of lobbying organizations which wrote down respectively 
immigration or trade as an issue in their lobbying report. Table 5 presents “total lobbying 
expenditures” while Table 6 shows “lobbying expenditures.” In both tables, we present 
industries ranked by the “sum” column, i.e. the column that gives the total expenditure in 
each sector over the period. We will focus our discussion on Table 6. 
Several interesting results emerge in Table 6. First, Table 6 shows clearly who the 
top spenders are – among industries – in terms of lobbying on respectively immigration 
or trade between 1998 and 2005. Moreover, it also allows us to study how concentrated 
lobbying activities are. Calculating the CR4 index,36 we can see that the four most active 
sectors represent approximately 29 percent of the total expenses on migration. Turning to 
trade, they represent approximately 21 percent of the total, suggesting that lobbying on 
this issue is substantially more diffused than lobbying on migration.  
Computers/Internet is the very top spender on lobbying for both issues over the 
period considered. The Computers/Internet industry spent approximately a total of 
US$16.8mn on migration and a total of US$38.5mn on trade in the years 1998-2005. 
Over the same period, on average a firm in this industry spent US$136,000 for lobbying 
on immigration in a given year,37 and US$118,000 for lobbying on trade.  
Among the top spenders on migration, we also find Education, Air Transport, 
Automotive, Hospitals/Nursing Homes, Miscellaneous Manufacturing & Distributing, 
and Agricultural Services/Products. The patterns in this table are consistent with 
anecdotal evidence. Except for the Air Transport industry, these are all sectors which use 
large numbers of immigrants. For example, many university professors and researchers 
are foreign-born. There is great demand for foreign nurses in the United States given the 
                                                
36 The CR4 index is a measure of concentration. In our context it is defined as lobbying carried out by the 
four top lobbying sectors as a share of the total lobbying on a given issue. 
37 Note that each of the 123 observations for the Computers/Internet industry in Table 6 corresponds to a 
given lobbying organization in a given year (thus, if an organization files in two different years, it counts 
twice). 
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low supply of native-born nurses. Finally, the agricultural sector is completely dependent 
on the work of immigrant (unskilled) labor. Note though that only Air Transport and 
Automotive appear also among the top ten spenders on trade policy, highlighting the 
presence of important differences in the relevance of trade and immigration for specific 
sectors of the economy. 
Interestingly, Table 6 highlights that the sector with the highest number of 
“organizations” lobbying on migration over the period is Education: in 1998-2005, 
universities/educational institutions carried out lobbying activity on migration 296 times 
(some of these observations correspond to the same university in different years). For 
example, Harvard University, Georgetown University, New York University, etc. are all 
in the dataset, often for multiple years. However, on average, between 1998 and 2005, a 
university/educational institution did not spend much on migration lobbying in a given 
year (approximately US$23,000). 
The two panels of Table 7 (like Table 4) focus on a more restricted sample, i.e. 
“organizations” spending lobbying money only on respectively immigration (panel a) or 
trade (panel b). In other words, these are the organizations which indicate only 
respectively migration or trade as a policy issue in their lobbying report. Table 7 presents 
the amounts of lobbying expenditures on migration for these organizations, industry by 
industry, in the 1998-2005 period. One of the industries with organizations carrying out 
lobbying activity exclusively on migration is Human Rights, where we observe 11 
instances in which money was spent for this purpose. This selected group of 
organizations in the Human Rights industry spent a total of US$1.8mn on lobbying for 
migration. Since migration is the only policy issue in the reports of these organizations, 
we know for sure that all this money was targeted at shaping migration policy. Turning to 
trade policy, we can see that Forestry and Forest Products and Steel production were 
industries with organizations lobbying exclusively on trade policy, spending respectively 
a total of US$10.1 mn and US$9.2 mn on lobbying for trade. Interestingly, lobbying 
activity on trade took place much more frequently, i.e. 28 and 58 times respectively.  
Finally, in Tables 8 and 9, we focus more directly on data at the lobbying-
organization level. First, notice that lobbying on trade and migration is positively 
correlated at the lobbying-organization level (Figure 5). In Table 8, we collapse the data 
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on “total lobbying expenditures” and “lobbying expenditures” on respectively migration 
and trade across years at the lobbying-organization level. In other words, we sum the 
values of the two variables, respectively, from all the lobbying reports corresponding to a 
given organization across all the eight years between 1998 and 2005. Table 8 shows the 
top 50 organizations in terms of lobbying expenditures on respectively migration and 
trade in 1998-2005. 
Note that the main difference between Table 6 and Table 8 is that Table 6 
provides information at the year-lobbying-organization level on average for each industry 
while Table 8 gives information at the lobbying-organization level summed over the eight 
years. So, for example, the US$136,511 value for the average in the Computers/Internet 
industry in Table 6 gives the average amount spent by a lobbying organization – for 
lobbying on immigration – in this sector in one year between 1998-2005. On the other 
hand, the US$3,564,231 value for “lobbying expenditures on migration” for Microsoft 
Corporation in Table 8 gives the sum of expenditures on migration by Microsoft in all the 
eight years. 
As already argued while discussing the sector-level results of Table 6, lobbying 
on migration appears to be substantially more concentrated than lobbying on trade. In the 
former case, the top 4 organizations contributed about 9 percent of the total amount spent 
on migration, whereas the top 4 contributed only 5 percent of the total spent on trade. The 
organization in the dataset which invested the largest amount on lobbying on migration 
over the eight years is Microsoft Corporation which, as mentioned above, spent 
approximately US$3.6 mn to affect migration in this period. Among the top 50 
organizations, we also find the American Farm Bureau Federation and the National 
Council of Agricultural Employers, the American Hospital Association, Disney 
Worldwide Services and, finally, also labor unions (United Auto Workers and the AFL-
CIO). Turning to lobbying on trade, the right panel of Table 8 shows that the US 
Chamber of Commerce was the top spender on the issue, with a total of US$10.4mn. The 
leading defense contractor Northrop Grumman was also very active in trying to shape US 
trade policy. This is not surprising given the sensitive nature of a substantial share of the 
firm’s production. Turning to information using data from lobbying reports where only 
migration or trade appear as an issue, Table 9 shows that the majority of the organizations 
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in these categories are either trade associations or ideology-issue groups,38 and not 
corporations.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 In this paper, we have used a lobbying-organization-level dataset of lobbying 
expenditures, covering the period between 1998 and 2005, and have analyzed lobbying 
activity specifically targeted at shaping immigration and trade. The dataset uses 
information from lobbying reports which organizations involved in lobbying have to file 
since 1996, after the passage of the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act. 
Several interesting points emerge from our analysis. First, while PAC 
contributions and lobbying are in general positively correlated, our results suggest that 
this is not the case when it comes to lobbying on migration. As a result any analysis that 
focuses on the role of pressure group activity in affecting migration should take 
advantage of the rich new data on lobbying, rather than relying only on PAC contribution 
data. Second, while overall lobbying expenditures increased steadily over our sample 
period, both lobbying on migration and trade appears to fluctuate more. Third, the total 
amount spent on lobbying for immigration and trade never exceeded 6 percent of the total 
lobbying contributions, and the total amount contributed with the purpose of shaping 
trade policy was typically four to six times larger than the amount contributed to shape 
migration policy (see Table 1). Fourth, turning to the sectoral distribution of lobbying 
activities, we have argued that lobbying on migration is substantially more concentrated 
than lobbying on trade. Finally, we have seen that a similar pattern emerges also when we 
examine the contributions of individual organizations.  
The analysis carried out in this paper is mainly descriptive and has allowed us to 
highlight some important similarities and differences in the patterns of lobbying on two 
facets of globalization, international migration and international trade. Neoclassical 
economic theory in the spirit of Heckscher and Ohlin suggests that trade and migration 
are substitutes, yet we have documented the existence of significant differences in the 
extent of pressure groups organization on these two issues, ranging from the amount of 
                                                
38 For a discussion on the role played by ideology-issue groups and corporations and trade associations, see 
de Figueredo and Richter (2014). 
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resources invested, to the number of organizations involved in lobbying, to the sectors in 
which these organizations are active. One interesting question that could be addressed 
using our data is to what extent are there differences in the returns to lobbying in these 
two areas. In other words, are greater monetary payoffs the main explanation for why 
lobbying on trade is more widespread than lobbying on migration? A second important 
question would instead focus on the extent to which organizations perceive migration and 
trade policy as political complements or substitutes. While answering these questions 
would enhance our understanding of the political economy of globalization, they go 
beyond the scope of this paper and are left for further research.   
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Appendix: Details about lobbying expenditures data 
 
In addition to campaign contributions to political candidates for election purposes, 
each year companies, labor unions, and other organizations spend billions of dollars to 
hire lobbying firms which lobby incumbent members of Congress and of federal agencies 
on their behalf. Some special interests hire external lobbying firms; others have lobbyists 
working in-house. 
The data on lobbying expenditures are compiled by the Center for Responsive 
Politics (CRP) using the semi-annual lobbying disclosure reports filed with the Secretary 
of the Senate's Office of Public Records (SOPR) and posted to its website. The reports 
analyzed by CRP cover lobbying activity that took place from 1998 through 2005. 
The Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995 requires lobbying firms and 
organizations to register and to file reports of their lobbying activities with the SOPR. In 
general, it requires registration by any individual lobbyist (or the individual's employer if 
it employs one or more lobbyists) within 45 days after the individual first makes – or is 
employed or retained to make – a lobbying contact with either the President, the Vice 
President, a Member of Congress, or any other specified Federal officer or employee, 
including certain high-ranking members of the uniformed services. 
A registrant must file a report for the semiannual period when registration initially 
occurs and for each semiannual period thereafter, including the period during which 
registration terminates. Lobbying firms (i.e., entities with one or more lobbyists, 
including self-employed individuals who act as lobbyists for outside clients) are required 
to file a separate report for each client covered by a registration. Organizations employing 
in-house lobbyists file a single report for each semiannual period. The semiannual report 
must be filed no later than 45 days after the end of a semiannual period beginning on the 
first day of January and the first day of July of every year in which a registrant is 
registered. The LDA requires the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives to make all registrations and reports available to the public as soon as 
practicable after they are received. 
Under the Section 3(10) of the LDA, an individual is defined as a “lobbyist” with 
respect to a particular client if he or she makes more than one lobbying contact on behalf 
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of that client (i.e. more than one communication to a covered official) and his or her 
“lobbying activities” constitute at least 20 percent of the individual's time in services for 
that client over any six-months period. “Lobbying activity” is defined in Section 3(7) of 
the LDA as “lobbying contacts or efforts in support of such contacts, including 
background work that is intended, at the time it was performed, for use in contacts, and 
coordination with the lobbying activities of others.” 
Section 15 of the LDA permits those organizations that file under Sections 
6033(b)(8) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and organizations that are subject to 
Section 162(e) of the IRC to use the tax law definitions of lobbying in lieu of the LDA 
definitions for determining “contacts” and “lobbying activities”. The definition of 
lobbying in the tax law is broader with respect to the type of activities reported, while it is 
narrower with respect to the executive branch officials who are contacted. For example, 
the definition of lobbying under the tax code includes “grass-roots”, state and local 
lobbying, while the LDA excludes these types of lobbying from the definition of 
“lobbying activities.” Under the amendment of the LDA in 1998, registrants who use tax 
law definitions of lobbying must use the IRC definition for executive branch lobbying 
and the LDA definition for legislative branch lobbying. 
There are three different filing methods listed in the form. Two options are largely 
identical (one for for-profit groups, the other for non-profit groups) and use the definition 
of lobbying provided by the IRC. The third follows the definition of lobbying contained 
in the LDA. As discussed above, filers using the IRC methods must report state, local and 
grassroots lobbying costs, which are not included in the reports which follow the LDA 
definition. Thus, lobbying expenditures may not be strictly comparable across 
organizations using different filing methods. 
	  	  
Election cycle 1999-2000 2001-02 2003-04
Contributions from PACs 326 348 461
Overall lobbying exp 2,949 3,330 4,048
     Of which exp for immigration 32 24 33
     Of which exp for trade 143 153 150
Total targeted political activity 3,275 3,678 4,509
Overall lobbying expenditures Immigration lobbying exp Trade lobbying exp
The “overall lobbying expenditures” are equal to the sum of firm-level lobbying expenditures on any issue of all firms/business associations/unions in all industries, year by year.
"Immigration lobbying expenditures" in the middle panel correspond to “total lobbying expenditures” in Figure 3. See end of Figure 3. Trade lobbying expenditures are defined as
"total trade lobbying expenditures".
Table 1. Targeted Political Activity
(in millions of US dollars)
Figure 1. Scatter Plots between Lobbying Expenditures and Campaign Contributions from PACs (mn US$), 1999-2004
Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Overall lobbying exp are equal to the sum of lobbying
expenditures of all firms on any issue. Exp for immigration (trade) are equal to lobbying
expenditures on migration (trade) of organizations spending money on immigration (trade).
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The “overall lobbying expenditures” are equal to the sum of lobbying expenditures on any issue of all
organizations in all industries by year. The “total lobbying expenditures” are equal to the sum of lobbying
expenditures on any issue of organizations spending money on immigration and trade in all industries, by
year. The “lobbying expenditures on migration and trade” are equal to the sum of lobbying expenditures on
migration and trade of organizations spending money on immigration in all industries by year.
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Figure 5. Correlation between Lobbying for Migration and Trade at the Lobbying Organization Level
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year Mean N Sum
Standard 
deviation
1998 893,178 220 196,000,000 1,876,152
1999 736,333 159 117,000,000 1,294,313
2000 880,145 231 203,000,000 2,054,638
2001 641,461 179 115,000,000 1,267,866
2002 651,462 212 138,000,000 1,421,388
2003 683,794 174 119,000,000 1,375,422
2004 894,266 220 197,000,000 1,888,383
2005 850,357 267 227,000,000 1,738,925
Total 789,762 1662 1,310,000,000 1,673,093
Table 2. Total i.e., on any issue lobbying expenditures of organizations spending money on immigration and trade, by year
Immigration
Mean N Sum
Standard 
deviation
878,372 642 564,000,000 2,031,008
735,493 694 510,000,000 1,428,041
707,860 935 662,000,000 1,552,776
763,889 752 574,000,000 1,604,979
761,280 976 743,000,000 1,666,063
865,700 671 581,000,000 1,819,264
885,300 675 598,000,000 1,872,284
933,013 798 745,000,000 2,098,886
810,135 6143 4,980,000,000 1,762,520
Trade
	  	  	  
year mean N sum
Standard 
deviation mean N sum
Standard 
deviation
1998 82,432 220 18,100,000 109,517 94,040 642 60,400,000 156,036
1999 83,089 159 13,200,000 121,003 99,120 694 68,800,000 150,365
2000 82,616 231 19,100,000 144,621 79,304 935 74,100,000 130,065
2001 71,659 179 12,800,000 114,784 102,587 752 77,100,000 161,651
2002 52,266 212 11,100,000 69,299 77,347 976 75,500,000 124,888
2003 76,852 174 13,400,000 112,179 114,595 671 76,900,000 190,322
2004 87,179 220 19,200,000 121,108 107,521 675 72,600,000 177,309
2005 86,240 267 23,000,000 173,099 115,749 798 92,400,000 256,102
Total 78,168 1662 130,000,000 126,706 97,312 6143 598,000,000 171,620
year mean N sum
Standard 
deviation mean N sum
Standard 
deviation
1998 122,333 12 1,468,000 120,950 105,701 63 6,659,190 148,258
1999 125,375 12 1,504,500 128,109 137,834 88 12,100,000 208,591
2000 176,983 10 1,769,830 225,844 107,746 85 9,158,380 170,347
2001 124,476 10 1,244,761 81,363 161,000 85 13,700,000 216,186
2002 126,000 10 1,260,000 82,084 155,361 72 11,200,000 177,954
2003 104,333 12 1,252,000 64,215 153,417 72 11,000,000 192,329
2004 110,598 14 1,548,370 73,986 129,509 59 7,641,000 171,498
2005 93,520 18 1,683,355 77,483 107,309 97 10,400,000 144,180
Total 119,702 98 11,700,000 110,740 131,906 621 81,900,000 181,337
Table 3. Lobbying expenditures on migration and trade of organizations spending money on immigration and trade, by year
Table 4. Lobbying expenditures on migration and trade of organizations money ONLY on immigration and trade, by year
Immigration Trade
Immigration Trade
	  	  	  
Industry (CRP classification) Mean N Sum Industry (CRP classification) Mean N Sum
Computers/Internet 1,503,544 123 185,000,000 Computers/Internet 1,003,548 325 326,000,000
Automotive 3,059,453 28 85,700,000 Insurance 1,694,670 162 275,000,000
Misc Manufacturing & Distributin 2,056,955 39 80,200,000 Automotive 1,407,872 164 231,000,000
Agricultural Services & Products 2,180,490 28 61,100,000 Defense Aerospace 2,433,202 85 207,000,000
Telephone Utilities 6,611,470 9 59,500,000 Business Associations 1,100,278 184 202,000,000
Business Associations 3,879,333 15 58,200,000 Air Transport 1,424,875 127 181,000,000
Education 190,244 296 56,300,000 Chemical & Related Manufacturing 582,402 261 152,000,000
Pharmaceuticals / Health Product 1,896,738 28 53,100,000 Agricultural Services & Products 635,948 211 134,000,000
Oil & Gas 1,908,955 27 51,500,000 Commercial Banks 2,660,327 45 120,000,000
Telecom Services & Equipment 2,833,410 16 45,300,000 Forestry & Forest Products 673,280 124 83,500,000
Air Transport 1,158,382 35 40,500,000 Electronics Mfg & Services 516,330 141 72,800,000
Business Services 1,273,613 31 39,500,000 Food Processing & Sales 365,513 194 70,900,000
Defense Aerospace 2,234,696 14 31,300,000 Beer, Wine & Liquor 593,631 114 67,700,000
Hospitals & Nursing Homes 533,982 55 29,400,000 Electric Utilities 568,532 119 67,700,000
Misc Unions 614,175 42 25,800,000 Defense Electronics 655,549 64 42,000,000
Electronics Mfg & Services 560,446 44 24,700,000 Crop Production & Basic Processi 140,027 297 41,600,000
Industrial Unions 1,065,288 22 23,400,000 Industrial Unions 624,747 61 38,100,000
Human Rights 237,941 92 21,900,000 Food & Beverage 421,876 85 35,900,000
Misc Issues 329,859 65 21,400,000 Business Services 916,595 37 33,900,000
Republican/Conservative 1,188,388 18 21,400,000 Accountants 1,122,641 28 31,400,000
Civil Servants/Public Officials 217,090 74 16,100,000 Finance / Credit Companies 671,986 42 28,200,000
Food & Beverage 580,574 27 15,700,000 Hospitals & Nursing Homes 1,518,127 15 22,800,000
Public Sector Unions 1,305,572 12 15,700,000 Mining 228,280 93 21,200,000
Recreation / Live Entertainment 400,652 35 14,000,000 Lawyers / Law Firms 367,815 56 20,600,000
Accountants 1,487,111 9 13,400,000 Civil Servants/Public Officials 192,579 103 19,800,000
Health Professionals 504,724 26 13,100,000 Building Materials & Equipment 268,860 70 18,800,000
Securities & Investment 840,653 14 11,800,000 Dairy 223,632 63 14,100,000
Transportation Unions 704,750 16 11,300,000 Home Builders 475,447 22 10,500,000
Tobacco 11,200,000 1 11,200,000 Misc Energy 188,240 54 10,200,000
Lawyers / Law Firms 451,698 24 10,800,000 Construction Services 265,730 35 9,300,553
TV / Movies / Music 814,715 13 10,600,000 General Contractors 302,003 30 9,060,093
Commercial Banks 2,710,000 3 8,130,000 Education 160,042 56 8,962,375
Food Processing & Sales 289,719 28 8,112,117 Health Services/HMOs 650,898 13 8,461,674
Real Estate 1,594,000 5 7,970,000 Livestock 268,034 31 8,309,065
Finance / Credit Companies 1,954,750 4 7,819,000 Casinos / Gambling 343,571 21 7,215,000
Lodging / Tourism 334,565 23 7,695,000 Building Trade Unions 222,126 29 6,441,667
Forestry & Forest Products 1,097,865 7 7,685,058 Human Rights 234,164 27 6,322,422
Beer, Wine & Liquor 824,192 9 7,417,729 Lodging / Tourism 541,364 11 5,955,000
Defense Electronics 911,063 8 7,288,500 Environment 200,679 28 5,618,997
Sea Transport 901,833 8 7,214,663 Misc Business 161,526 29 4,684,264
Insurance 2,193,333 3 6,580,000 Foreign & Defense Policy 135,667 25 3,391,674
Non-profits, Foundations & Phila 218,667 30 6,560,000 Misc Communications/Electronics 227,692 13 2,960,000
Crop Production & Basic Processi 286,767 20 5,735,332 Health Professionals 212,964 11 2,342,600
Chemical & Related Manufacturing 423,868 12 5,086,420 Lobbyists 133,200 15 1,998,000
Building Materials & Equipment 702,763 7 4,919,342 Environmental Svcs/Equipment 102,000 10 1,020,000
Other-Other 314,092 15 4,711,383 Fisheries & Wildlife 91,667 6 550,000
Dairy 337,154 13 4,383,000 Democratic/Liberal 189,782 2 379,564
Casinos / Gambling 528,750 8 4,230,000 Clergy & Religious Organizations 107,573 2 215,145
Retail Sales 574,286 7 4,020,000 Gun Control 80,000 2 160,000
Health Services/HMOs 312,604 12 3,751,250 Gun Rights 120,000 1 120,000
Table 5. Total (i.e., on any issue) lobbying expenditures of organizations spending money on immigration and trade, by industry, top 
50, CRP classification, in 1998-2005
TradeImmigration
	  	  	  
Industry (CRP classification) mean N sum
Computers/Internet 136,511 123 16,800,000
Misc Issues 135,655 65 8,817,561
Education 23,449 296 6,940,910
Air Transport 160,333 35 5,611,670
Hospitals & Nursing Homes 93,761 55 5,156,856
Misc Manufacturing & Distributin 130,663 39 5,095,843
Automotive 170,844 28 4,783,620
Pharmaceuticals / Health Product 154,597 28 4,328,723
Telephone Utilities 477,450 9 4,297,054
Human Rights 46,574 92 4,284,772
Business Associations 266,488 15 3,997,322
Business Services 119,143 31 3,693,440
Telecom Services & Equipment 227,018 16 3,632,281
Oil & Gas 132,035 27 3,564,937
Agricultural Services & Products 117,524 28 3,290,668
Electronics Mfg & Services 56,069 44 2,467,027
Health Professionals 88,351 26 2,297,130
Recreation / Live Entertainment 55,684 35 1,948,928
Civil Servants/Public Officials 25,811 74 1,910,011
Misc Agriculture 146,390 13 1,903,071
Accountants 202,036 9 1,818,323
Defense Aerospace 115,031 14 1,610,429
Food & Beverage 58,898 27 1,590,238
Lodging / Tourism 68,771 23 1,581,738
Foreign & Defense Policy 57,051 27 1,540,387
Industrial Unions 68,433 22 1,505,519
Lawyers / Law Firms 61,535 24 1,476,848
Misc Unions 34,949 42 1,467,840
Republican/Conservative 80,404 18 1,447,275
Other-Other 92,101 15 1,381,522
Food Processing & Sales 45,527 28 1,274,768
Securities & Investment 82,844 14 1,159,817
Sea Transport 137,926 8 1,103,407
Non-profits, Foundations & Phila 36,201 30 1,086,036
Public Sector Unions 73,265 12 879,185
Building Materials & Equipment 114,839 7 803,870
TV / Movies / Music 61,529 13 799,876
Finance / Credit Companies 189,953 4 759,811
Dairy 51,375 13 667,869
Forestry & Forest Products 91,482 7 640,377
Misc Business 106,315 6 637,891
Health Services/HMOs 52,987 12 635,841
Crop Production & Basic Processi 31,696 20 633,918
Transportation Unions 36,871 16 589,932
Chemical & Related Manufacturing 47,622 12 571,459
Retail Sales 79,548 7 556,833
Beer, Wine & Liquor 61,299 9 551,695
Defense Electronics 62,699 8 501,596
Commercial Banks 166,791 3 500,373
Tobacco 486,957 1 486,957
Table 6. Lobbying expenditures on migration and trade of organizations spending money on these issues, by industry, CRP 
classification, in 1998-2005
Immigration
Industry (CRP classification) mean N sum
Computers/Internet 118,326 325 38,500,000
Business Associations 204,296 184 37,600,000
Insurance 195,374 162 31,700,000
Automotive 123,363 164 20,200,000
Air Transport 153,032 127 19,400,000
Forestry & Forest Products 156,055 124 19,400,000
Chemical & Related Manufacturing 70,007 261 18,300,000
Crop Production & Basic Processi 50,649 297 15,000,000
Defense Aerospace 174,845 85 14,900,000
Beer, Wine & Liquor 116,766 114 13,300,000
Agricultural Services & Products 58,772 211 12,400,000
Food Processing & Sales 63,449 194 12,300,000
Electronics Mfg & Services 82,099 141 11,600,000
Commercial Banks 212,084 45 9,543,785
Electric Utilities 66,679 119 7,934,787
Food & Beverage 77,077 85 6,551,511
Mining 60,913 93 5,664,865
Accountants 147,665 28 4,134,612
Building Materials & Equipment 56,017 70 3,921,162
Industrial Unions 55,549 61 3,388,463
Lawyers / Law Firms 57,713 56 3,231,953
Misc Business 109,081 29 3,163,359
Dairy 48,622 63 3,063,186
Business Services 74,604 37 2,760,356
Defense Electronics 41,394 64 2,649,237
Finance / Credit Companies 51,970 42 2,182,731
General Contractors 71,716 30 2,151,465
Foreign & Defense Policy 68,420 25 1,710,488
Civil Servants/Public Officials 15,509 103 1,597,455
Construction Services 44,967 35 1,573,860
Hospitals & Nursing Homes 101,890 15 1,528,356
Misc Energy 27,485 54 1,484,180
Casinos / Gambling 63,006 21 1,323,128
Livestock 39,577 31 1,226,884
Misc Communications/Electronics 76,821 13 998,667
Health Services/HMOs 68,245 13 887,181
Lodging / Tourism 79,920 11 879,124
Education 15,692 56 878,751
Home Builders 38,307 22 842,757
Environment 29,751 28 833,023
Human Rights 19,412 27 524,114
Building Trade Unions 14,574 29 422,653
Lobbyists 27,397 15 410,952
Health Professionals 25,678 11 282,460
Fisheries & Wildlife 32,917 6 197,500
Environmental Svcs/Equipment 11,881 10 118,808
Clergy & Religious Organizations 20,725 2 41,449
Democratic/Liberal 14,599 2 29,197
Gun Control 13,333 2 26,667
Gun Rights 20,000 1 20,000
Trade
	  	  	  
Industry (CRP classification) mean N sum
Misc Issues 216,182 21 4,539,830
Human Rights 161,818 11 1,780,000
Foreign & Defense Policy 132,091 8 1,056,725
Lawyers / Law Firms 73,269 14 1,025,761
Misc Agriculture 178,000 4 712,000
Business Services 79,714 7 558,000
Health Professionals 114,500 4 458,000
Other-Other 57,500 4 230,000
Miscellaneous Services 212,500 1 212,500
Food Processing & Sales 100,000 2 200,000
Education 36,000 5 180,000
Civil Servants/Public Officials 80,000 2 160,000
Hospitals & Nursing Homes 52,667 3 158,000
Misc Unions 40,000 3 120,000
Securities & Investment 33,333 3 100,000
Pharmaceuticals / Health Product 80,000 1 80,000
Food & Beverage 40,000 1 40,000
Pro-Israel 40,000 1 40,000
Recreation / Live Entertainment 20,000 2 40,000
Savings & Loans 40,000 1 40,000
Total 119,702 98 11,700,000
Industry (CRP classification) mean N sum
Business Associations 155,035 82 12,700,000
Misc Manufacturing & Distributin 123,713 87 10,800,000
Forestry & Forest Products 360,757 28 10,100,000
Steel Production 158,966 58 9,220,000
Crop Production & Basic Processi 84,371 62 5,231,000
Mining 174,778 18 3,146,000
Retail Sales 92,102 30 2,763,055
Misc Business 161,188 17 2,740,194
Food Processing & Sales 151,656 18 2,729,805
Chemical & Related Manufacturing 87,185 27 2,354,000
Electronics Mfg & Services 115,000 20 2,300,000
Computers/Internet 168,750 12 2,025,000
General Contractors 700,000 2 1,400,000
Agricultural Services & Products 77,647 17 1,320,000
Building Materials & Equipment 98,846 13 1,285,000
Oil & Gas 177,143 7 1,240,000
Pharmaceuticals / Health Product 67,742 17 1,151,612
Foreign & Defense Policy 140,000 8 1,120,000
Lawyers / Law Firms 109,564 10 1,095,638
Food & Beverage 76,429 14 1,070,000
Real Estate 306,667 3 920,000
Beer, Wine & Liquor 77,500 8 620,000
Automotive 76,875 8 615,000
Textiles 54,545 11 600,000
Printing & Publishing 89,167 6 535,000
Tobacco 225,000 2 450,000
Electric Utilities 120,000 3 360,000
Recreation / Live Entertainment 90,000 4 360,000
Telephone Utilities 150,000 2 300,000
Misc Issues 50,300 5 251,500
Business Services 110,000 2 220,000
Misc Transport 73,333 3 220,000
TV / Movies / Music 70,000 2 140,000
Air Transport 40,000 3 120,000
Telecom Services & Equipment 40,000 3 120,000
Fisheries & Wildlife 100,000 1 100,000
Lobbyists 50,000 1 50,000
Securities & Investment 22,000 2 44,000
Misc Energy 40,000 1 40,000
Dairy 20,000 1 20,000
Poultry & Eggs 20,000 1 20,000
Republican/Conservative 20,000 1 20,000
Sea Transport 20,000 1 20,000
Total 131,906 621 81,900,000
Table 7a. Lobbying expenditures on migration for organizations spending 
money ONLY on immigration, by industry, CRP classification, in 1998-2005
Table 7b. Lobbying expenditures on trade for organizations spending 
money ONLY on trade, by industry, CRP classification, in 1998-2005
	  	  
Firm
Total lobbying 
exp
Lobbying exp on 
migration Firm
Total lobbying 
exp
Lobbying exp on 
trade
Microsoft Corp 48,220,000 3,564,231 US Chamber of Commerce 77,432,880 10,400,000
Motorola Inc 33,293,458 2,660,473 Northrop Grumman 76,916,386 7,142,483
Business Roundtable 37,460,000 2,514,167 Pharmaceutical Rsrch & Mfrs of America 86,202,000 6,953,933
American Farm Bureau Federation 49,589,013 2,505,281 Sprint Corp 47,276,585 6,675,330
United to Secure America 5,110,000 2,276,667 Business Roundtable 88,240,000 6,013,287
American Hospital Assn 13,420,000 2,236,667 Emergency Cmte for American Trade 5,940,000 5,550,000
Intel Corp 27,210,000 2,225,185 Boeing Co 68,273,310 5,408,107
Federation for Amer Immigration Reform 2,200,000 2,200,000 Investment Co Institute 37,777,000 5,317,040
Verizon Communications 33,110,000 2,197,689 Securities Industry Assn 52,307,518 4,615,882
Texas Instruments 17,122,728 2,004,260 Textron Inc 36,460,000 4,576,115
National Assn of Manufacturers 40,080,585 1,966,480 Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports 5,946,980 4,556,585
US Border Control 3,741,110 1,850,650 Citigroup Inc 51,115,000 4,313,765
Disney Worldwide Services 26,738,800 1,790,415 Merck & Co 41,672,294 4,180,079
American Council on Intl Personnel 1,670,000 1,670,000 BellSouth Corp 32,583,435 4,170,843
American Electronics Assn 18,804,902 1,599,212 British Columbia Lumber Trade Council 5,000,000 4,160,000
EDS Corp 17,045,832 1,579,240 General Electric 122,100,000 4,027,142
IBM Corp 29,852,000 1,528,373 IBM Corp 47,372,000 3,907,789
Delta Airlines 14,280,000 1,364,444 Distilled Spirits Council 21,275,708 3,893,704
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society 1,255,225 1,255,225 AT&T 49,963,499 3,842,748
Eli Lilly & Co 16,690,000 1,195,061 Microsoft Corp 54,720,000 3,814,231
Accenture 11,899,000 1,176,559 American International Group 44,618,300 3,808,708
National Council of Agric Employers 2,535,000 1,146,071 American Council of Life Insurers 33,613,948 3,806,847
International Council of Cruise Lines 7,214,663 1,103,407 Abbott Laboratories 32,326,000 3,653,557
Continental Airlines 5,235,927 1,069,416 National Foreign Trade Council 10,806,000 3,470,167
DaimlerChrysler 19,295,905 1,059,511 Motorola Inc 43,000,369 3,397,518
SBC Communications 13,344,729 1,053,865 Advanced Medical Technology Assn 23,842,974 3,357,162
Shell Oil 15,917,789 1,051,698 Eli Lilly & Co 39,596,890 3,341,846
Commonwealth of the N Mariana Islands 3,800,000 1,020,533 Philip Morris 75,528,000 3,304,895
General Motors 23,440,000 1,012,967 Tailored Clothing Assn 3,600,000 3,220,000
Human Rights Campaign 8,272,498 1,007,668 Ford Motor Co 58,510,808 3,092,824
Major League Baseball Commissioner's Ofc 8,372,801 912,806 Altria Group 39,505,000 2,963,544
Christian Coalition 15,380,000 911,157 AFLAC Inc 19,920,000 2,918,095
Chevron Corp 8,550,000 855,000 New York Life Insurance 18,960,000 2,894,881
United Airlines 4,400,000 797,333 News Corp 21,916,000 2,836,372
United Auto Workers 15,655,390 794,666 SBC Communications 45,447,736 2,824,350
Western Pacific Economic Council 2,350,000 783,333 Intel Corp 34,310,000 2,816,851
Agricultural Cltn for Immigration Reform 892,000 757,000 GlaxoSmithKline 24,470,000 2,810,141
Honda North America 7,850,457 738,058 Johnson & Johnson 23,665,000 2,789,786
Sun Microsystems 6,540,000 737,950 American Insurance Assn 32,796,161 2,749,042
Oracle Corp 7,500,590 735,801 Lockheed Martin 60,626,287 2,704,506
General Electric 16,900,000 734,783 Computer Systems Policy Project 6,840,400 2,685,720
Lockheed Martin 17,080,000 718,235 American Farm Bureau Federation 49,589,013 2,505,281
Natl Assn of Public Hosp & Health Sys 3,520,000 710,619 Prudential Financial 20,185,745 2,497,337
AFL-CIO 18,230,000 694,634 Pernod Ricard 7,428,000 2,496,000
Biotechnology Industry Organization 10,659,796 671,146 DaimlerChrysler 37,419,499 2,473,099
English First 4,550,000 653,143 United Defense 8,723,893 2,463,705
Abbott Laboratories 6,717,000 627,700 Bristol-Myers Squibb 36,920,579 2,408,540
Ford Motor Co 13,080,000 622,857 Debswana Diamond Co 2,420,000 2,400,000
Air Transport Assn of America 3,107,922 621,584 General Motors 60,706,192 2,381,741
Principal Financial Group 9,554,140 616,124 Hong Kong Trade Development Council 5,060,000 2,380,000
Table 8. Top 50 organizations in terms of lobbying expenditures on migration and trade, in 1998-2005
	  Firm
Lobbying exp on 
migration Firm
Lobbying exp on trade
Federation for Amer Immigration Reform 2,200,000 Emergency Cmte for American Trade 5,980,000
American Council on Intl Personnel 1,670,000 British Columbia Lumber Trade Council 4,320,000
US Border Control 1,259,830 Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports 3,996,190
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society 1,255,225 Tailored Clothing Assn 3,340,000
Agricultural Cltn for Immigration Reform 712,000 Debswana Diamond Co 2,380,000
Fragomen Del Rey et al 565,000 European-American Business Council 2,195,000
O'Grady Peyton International 556,000 British Columbia Softwood Trade Council 1,975,000
NumbersUSA.com 480,000 Japan Iron & Steel Federation 1,880,000
American Immigration Lawyers Assn 430,761 Dole Food 1,820,000
Southwestern/Great American Inc 340,000 Integrated Steel Producers Coalition 1,820,000
AIS Inc 210,000 Footwear Distribs & Retailers of America 1,413,055
Coalition for Comprehensive Imm Reform 210,000 Japan Electronics & Info Tech Industries 1,270,000
IBP Inc 200,000 Nucor Corp 1,200,000
Commission on Grads Foreign Nursing Schl 180,000 Canfor Corp 1,160,000
National Assn of Immigration Judges 160,000 Hynix Semiconductor 1,150,000
National Immigration Forum 160,000 Evans International 1,120,000
United to Secure America 150,000 Nikon Corp 1,100,000
United Farm Workers 120,000 ED&F Man 1,082,000
Assomull Mukesh 100,000 ANSAC 1,040,000
US Cmte for Refugees & Immigrants 90,000 Intellectual Property Committee 1,040,000
Eurapair International 80,000 Consuming Industries Trade Action Cltn 940,000
Norbrook Laboratories 80,000 American Standard Development Co 900,000
Banner Health Care 68,000 Renova Inc 900,000
American Business for Legal Immigration 60,000 Willkie Farr & Gallagher 880,000
Just Care 60,000 European Confed of Iron & Steel Indus 840,000
Caribbean Marine Service 40,000 Orlando Food 804,184
Council of Jewish Federations 40,000 Ad Hoc Nitrogen Committee 780,000
Israel Discount Bank of New York 40,000 Koenig & Bauer 780,000
Pepper Hamilton LLP 30,000 Northwest Fruit Exporters 773,000
St Bernard Hospital 30,000 JC Bamford 720,000
Compete America 20,000 Clariant Corp 660,000
Fed of Employers & Workers of America 20,000 JD Irving Ltd 640,000
McKinsey & Co 20,000 Goss International 600,000
Six Flags 20,000 Sabic Americas 600,000
Victor Alberto Venero Garrido 20,000 New Zealand-US Business Council 580,000
Washington Soccer Partners 20,000 FSCL/Gay & Robins/RGVSG 574,000
Wu David 20,000 American-Australian Free Trade Agmt Cltn 570,000
Bangladeshi-American Friendship Society 14,000 Arcelor SA 560,000
Table 9. Lobbying expenditures on migration and trade from lobbying reports of organizations where ONLY migration/trade appears as a policy issue (top 
40 for trade), in 1998-2005
	  	  
Code Issue Code Issue
 ACC  Accounting  MED  Medical/Disease Research/ Clinical Labs 
 ADV  Advertising  MMM  Medicare/Medicaid 
 AER  Aerospace  MON  Minting/Money/ Gold Standard 
 AGR  Agriculture  NAT  Natural Resources 
 ALC  Alcohol & Drug Abuse  PHA  Pharmacy 
 ANI  Animals  POS  Postal 
 APP  Apparel/Clothing Industry/Textiles  RRR  Railroads 
 ART  Arts/Entertainment  RES  Real Estate/Land Use/Conservation 
 AUT  Automotive Industry  REL  Religion 
 AVI  Aviation/Aircraft/ Airlines  RET  Retirement 
 BAN  Banking  ROD  Roads/Highway 
 BNK  Bankruptcy  SCI  Science/Technology 
 BEV  Beverage Industry  SMB  Small Business 
 BUD  Budget/Appropriations  SPO  Sports/Athletics 
 CHM  Chemicals/Chemical Industry  TAX  Taxation/Internal Revenue Code 
 CIV  Civil Rights/Civil Liberties  TEC  Telecommunications 
 CAW  Clean Air & Water (Quality)  TOB  Tobacco 
 CDT  Commodities (Big Ticket)  TOR  Torts 
 COM  Communications/ Broadcasting/ Radio/TV  TRD  Trade (Domestic & Foreign) 
 CPI  Computer Industry  TRA  Transportation 
 CSP  Consumer Issues/Safety/ Protection  TOU  Travel/Tourism 
 CON  Constitution  TRU  Trucking/Shipping 
 CPT  Copyright/Patent/ Trademark  URB  Urban Development/ Municipalities 
 DEF  Defense  UNM  Unemployment 
 DOC  District of Columbia  UTI  Utilities 
 DIS  Disaster Planning/Emergencies  VET  Veterans 
 ECN  Economics/Economic Development  WAS  Waste (hazardous/ solid/ interstate/ nuclear) 
 EDU  Education  WEL  Welfare 
 ENG  Energy/Nuclear 
 ENV  Environmental/Superfund 
 FAM  Family Issues/Abortion/ Adoption 
 FIR  Firearms/Guns/ Ammunition 
 FIN  Financial Institutions/Investments/ Securities 
 FOO  Food Industry (Safety, Labeling, etc.) 
 FOR  Foreign Relations 
 FUE  Fuel/Gas/Oil 
 GAM  Gaming/Gambling/ Casino 
 GOV  Government Issues 
 HCR  Health Issues 
 HOU  Housing 
 IMM  Immigration 
 IND  Indian/Native American Affairs 
 INS  Insurance 
 LBR  Labor Issues/Antitrust/ Workplace 
 LAW  Law Enforcement/Crime/ Criminal Justice 
 MAN  Manufacturing 
 MAR  Marine/Maritime/ Boating/Fisheries 
 MIA  Media (Information/ Publishing) 
Source: Senate’s Office of Public Records (SOPR)
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